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A PRIMER ON THE SUBPRIME CRISIS 
Laurent CLERC 
Financial Stability Directorate 
The catalyst of the current financial turmoil has been the losses on the subprime mortgage market. 
However, the low quality of these partly collateralised housing loans was known for a while and the 
default on subprime mortgages largely expected. Therefore, how to account for the fact that an 
expected shock on a small segment of the US mortgage market turned into a major financial crisis, 
causing the near-collapse of the Commercial Paper and of the interbank lending markets, that is to say 
of two of the most liquid financial markets? 
 
Banks have transferred risks to special entities, the so-called “conduits”, SIV (Special Investment 
Vehicles) and SPV (Special Purpose Vehicles). Such a practice gave the false impression that credit 
risk was transferred from banks outside the financial system. This was indeed not the case. The 
funding needs associated in particular with backup lines of credit for off-balance sheet vehicles 
generated pressures on the the interbank markets and led central banks to massively intervene. 
 
The roots of the current turmoil are therefore of a deeper and structural nature. For that reason, it is 
necessary to assess, from a longer term perspective, what are the main consequences of the recent 
structural changes on financial markets in order to have a good grasp on the current financial market 
dynamics and clarify what is meant nowadays by liquidity. 
 
 
The recent trends on financial market and liquidity 
 
Disintermediation, financial liberalisation and deregulation, and securitisation… 
 
Disintermediation, deregulation and securitisation are probably the most striking developments 
observed in financial markets over the past decade. They have not only profoundly changed the 
financial landscape but also the contour of liquidity. 
 
Nowadays, a significant source of liquidity and credit lies outside the banking system. Besides 
banks-mediated liquidity, traditionally measured by monetary and credit aggregates, there is a second 
and growing component which depends on the amount of credit non-bank financial intermediaries are 
willing to extend to each others.
1 Those two components have tended to move together and, to some 
extent, reinforced each other over the recent years: ample liquidity, measured by aggregate money or 
credit, was considered as a key driver to easy money on financial markets. On the other hand, “easy” 
finance has exacerbated investor’s willingness to take on more risk and high levels of leverage, 
fuelling credit and monetary expansion. 
 
                                                      
1 See Cournède (B.), Ahrend (R.) and Price (R.) (2008): “Have financial trends changed the transmission of monetary policy?”, OECD 
Economics Department Working Papers, OECD, Paris, forthcoming. A primer on the subprime crisis 
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The elimination of some structural barriers between investment banking and retail banking has also 
facilitated fluidity in credit flows from originators of loans to issuers of debt products. It has also 
fostered competition within the financial sector and has given an impetus to financial innovation. 
 
Finally, securitisation has not only allowed banks to liquefy financial assets but also has opened new 
investment opportunities for the banking sector, involving the origination of loans for the purpose of 
packaging and selling them as securities. Over the recent years, securitisation has expanded to 
virtually all kinds of receivables. 
 
…have contributed to the emergence of the “originate and distribute model” 
 
These trends have given birth to a new business model, the so-called “originate and distribute model”, 
by which banks originate loans and then distribute the underlying risk to a pool of investors by means 
of dedicated instruments. 
 
Previously the loans, mostly originated by banks, were kept on their balance sheet and monitored by 
the banks for their entire life. Banks, through the securitisation process, have now the possibility to 
offload credit risk from their balance sheet and transfer it to others investors. The steps underlying the 
production of a loan, such as a mortgage, are very complex nowadays
2 and are usually divided into 
distinct activities, in general carrying out each of them within different entities. For example, the 
complete process for the production of a mortgage typically involves as many different players as a 
borrower, an originator, an arranger who bundles loans together as a structured product, a warehouse 
lender credit risk agency, an asset manager and a mortgage loan servicer. Consequently, credit risk is 
more widely spread in the financial sector and sold to a wide spectrum of investors, not only better 
equipped but also more willing to bear it. In such a context, bank capital can be used more efficiently 
and consequently, the supply of credit increased. 
 
The steady shift in banks' assets from loans to securities has magnified the sensitivity of bank balance 
sheets to valuation techniques. Indeed, the valuation of complex structured instruments is quite 
challenging. In effect, securities have to be evaluated at their fair value, i.e. marked to market or 
possibly to model. As the bulk of structured finance instruments are not traded in secondary markets, 
i.e. basically no market price exists, financial firms then tend to rely on a complex combination of 
credit pricing models, where external credit rating comes into play, and thinly traded derivatives that 
share more or less the same features as of the product to be valued. 
 
 
What are the main drawbacks of such a business model? 
 
- Credit market imperfections. In this model, issuers of loans may have less incentive to ensure loans 
viability since they expect to transfer credit risks to other investors. This type of moral hazard problem 
is even stronger when loans are originated by non-regulated entities. At the following step, the buyers 
of the loans that intend to repackage them into complex credit instruments have little incentive to 
scrutinise the quality of the acquired assets. The reason is that the ultimate buyers are mainly guided 
by the credit rating of the underlying assets. Asymmetric information thus plagues every step in the 
process and provides a powerful source of contagion. On the top of that, a key condition for such a 
system to operate is that liquidity is permanently made available to each market participant involved in 
the process. 
 
- Valuation. By nature, structured products are not very liquid. The main reason is that they are 
structured to suit precisely the characteristics and the risk profile needed by their buyer. This restricts 
their ability to be sold later on to other investors who may not have the same preferences or needs. 
This involves an element of circularity since fair valuation must be based on a market price due to 
                                                      
2 See for instance Ashcraft (A. B.) and Huermann (T.) (2007): “Understanding the securitization of subprime mortgage credit”, Mimeo, 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, December. A primer on the subprime crisis 
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IFRS requirements, the ability to price an asset itself depends on sufficient liquidity in the market and, 
finally, liquidity depends on valuation. 
 
In this setup, credit rating agencies are endorsed with an essential function as they gather and control 
information concerning borrowers. This information is essential to assess the risk and return on the 
various assets and therefore to facilitate price discovery. In addition, on securitised markets, the rating 
system enables all players to have access to simple, clear and concise information on the credit risk 
attached to the various classes and categories of financial instruments. The rating process has become 
an integral part of the design and financial engineering of these products. Rating agencies determine 
the size of the tranches, the seniority levels. They supply the methods and the models for assessing 
risks and their correlation and impose the necessary conditions securitisation vehicles have to meet in 
order to be able to issue. By allowing the comparability of tailored structured products with a wide 
array of assets, they ensure their marketability, or to put it another way, their liquidity. 
 
There are however two striking weaknesses in this chain: first, rating agencies consider themselves as 
responsible for solely assessing credit risk and therefore, their ratings do not encompass liquidity risk 
whereby investors believe they do so. Second, the metric used for rating structured products is 
identical, in terms of presentation, to that used for traditional bond products. For investors, an 
AAA rating has traditionally been associated with a stable investment. In addition, it seems that given 
the low return on such products, investors have less incentive to thoroughly analyse the nature and the 
sensitivity of the ratings. This may not be the appropriate behaviour vis-à-vis structured products, 
which have shown huge volatility in their ratings, as evidence during the financial turmoil. 
 
- Increased uncertainty about asset valuation, risk exposure and counterparty risk. The diversity and 
the complexity of valuation techniques can result in a considerable variation in fair value estimates 
across firms. As a consequence, a number of financial firms do not have a clear stake in the longer run 
performance of the underlying loans. In addition, wide distribution of risks associated to the 
complexity of structured product may obscure where the risk truly reside. In such a circumstance, the 
deterioration in the value of some assets, such as observed in US subprime-related assets, in particular 
mortgage-backed securities, can lead to an increase in uncertainty about the intrinsic value of several 
large classes of financial assets, whether they are exposed or not to the US subprime mortgage market. 
This is in sharp contrast with the standard bank-intermediation model where asset and credit 
valuations are tied to fundamentals and made at historical costs and therefore less prone to market 
price fluctuations. In the context of the securitisation model, valuation problems may translate into 
capital shortages through fair value accounting, as asset price fluctuations immediately show up on 
banks' balance sheet. 
 
- The relative inadequacy of capital to risk in the new securitisation model. New entities, such as 
conduits and SIV did, until recently, perform maturity transformation on a significant scale without 
any capital to absorb shocks. However, most of them were equipped with backup lines of credit or 
other guarantees by the sponsoring banks which were substituting for equity which otherwise would 
have been required for these entities to issue highly rated AAA commercial papers. Securitisation does 
not fully shield banks from credit risk on the assets transferred. First, originators usually retain 
exposure to the first defaults on the loans they sell. In times of stress, this exposure will reduce profits 
and therefore equity capital. Second, large amounts of loan-backed instruments were acquired through 
conduits or SIV which benefit from large contingency credit lines from the banks that set them up, 
precisely to face liquidity risks. As illustrated this summer, as conduits call on their credit lines, bank 
balance sheets can expand considerably in times of stress, lowering the amount of excess capital 
available to back new lending. 
 A primer on the subprime crisis 
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Consequences and challenges for policy markers 
 
From a liquidity shock… 
The combination of the above mentioned drawbacks has been responsible for this abrupt regime shift 
from a situation characterised by ample liquidity to a liquidity shortage. There are alternative 
explanations to account for such a shift: first, a rise in uncertainty.
3 Because of both the complexity 
and the rapid proliferation of structured instruments, market participants lack historical record to 
assess and measure how these financial instruments will behave in periods of stress. The fact that 
AAA ratings appeared less stable than normally expected for this class of assets, with examples of 
downgrades of several notches in a day, led investors to question the valuation of all types of credit 
products (i.e. not just mortgage). As a result, uncertainty
4 may have led market players to make 
decision based on worst-case scenario. Though this behaviour is rational in order to make robust 
decisions when confronted with uncertainty, the aggregation of individual rational decisions may have 
produced a suboptimal macroeconomic outcome: market participants that have the liquidity stayed out 
of the market. Some stopped trading due to perceived heightened counterparty risks; others hoarded 
liquidity in a context of heightened uncertainty regarding their own future liquidity needs and 
risk exposure. 
Second, increased competition amongst financial intermediaries: the disintermediation process has 
fostered competition between financial intermediaries, in particular between banks and non-bank 
institutions. However, banks still play an important role in channeling liquidity from the banking 
system to where it is most needed. They have in particular access to central bank money and this may 
provide them, in particular in period of stress, with the ability to hoard the liquidity injected by central 
banks and organise rationing or liquidity squeezes vis-à-vis their main competitors. Another rationale, 
in the context of asymmetric information, is the potential link between competition and strategic 
hedging decisions. In such a setup
5, financial firms may have an incentive to make risk management 
choices that transfer liquidity to those states in which its competitors are relatively cash constrained. 
As hedging strategies are not perfectly observable, the mechanism gives rise to adverse selection. In 
such a situation, a small liquidity shock may lead to the deterioration of the quality of the pool of 
financial institutions short of liquidity, which in turn leads liquidity providers to keep their liquidity on 
hand. Such behaviour questions the respective roles and tools of central banks, banks and non banks in 
creating and maintaining deep and liquid markets. 
 
…to capital shortage? 
 
Since the beginning of the turmoil, banks have been experiencing increasing pressures on their balance 
sheet. On the asset side, the process of securitizing or syndicating assets have left banks with large 
loans and warehousing risks that were in the process of being sold, when the crisis arose. The lower 
ability of markets to absorb securitised assets abruptly reduced the capacity of banks to transfer assets 
off-balance sheet. Simultaneously, assets that were previously off-loaded by banks had to be brought 
back on balance sheet, on account of credit, liquidity or reputation risks. Indeed, banks are vulnerable 
to allegations that they have not screened borrowers adequately or not properly warned investors of 
the risks arising from the products they have securitised. Managing reputation risk has played a crucial 
role in banks’ decision to support the vehicles they have sponsored or to participate in their 
restructuring even if they were under no strict legal obligation. On the capital side, valuation impacted 
capital buffers through write offs. Finally, the funding cost for banks has increased and the conditions 
for raising new capital have tightened while, on the equity side, the sharp fall of banks’ market 
capitalizations has increased the implied cost of equity issuance. Signs of capital shortages have also 
materialised outside the banking sector. Monoline bond insurers, who are important counterparties 
                                                      
3  See Caballero (R.) and Krishnamurthy (A.) (2008): “Musical chairs: a comment on the credit crisis”, Financial Stability Review, No. 11, 
Banque de France, February, forthcoming. 
4  We refer to Knightian uncertainty, i.e. uncertainty regarding the true underlying distribution of risks. 
5  See for instance Adam, Dasgupta and Titman (2008): “Financial constraints, competition and hedging”, forthcoming, Journal of Finance. A primer on the subprime crisis 
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selling credit protection on senior and super senior RMBS and CDO tranches, have also faced 
important mark-to-market losses. 
 
 




In the short-term, some dysfunctions need to be addressed without necessarily calling for more 
regulation. First, because many corrective initiatives are related to financial institutions’ internal 
business decisions. Second, the scope for regulation is to provide the right incentives to improve 
market efficiency. This may call for marginal adjustments on both capital and valuation requirements 
but not more. Finally, tight regulation has been one of the major drivers of financial innovations over 
the past decades. Moreover, as neatly pointed out by Charles Goodhart, regulation should not be 




Improving information and transparency 
 
The main feature of credit market is market imperfections and part of the current turmoil resides in the 
presence of asymmetric information, moral hazard and adverse selection. One way to restore 
confidence is to increase information and transparency. The gradual implementation of Basel II from 
2008 will address some of these issues regarding regulated entities. From that perspective, the role and 
the importance of liquidity risk should be acknowledged and better factored in existent regulatory 
requirements. This requires for instance accounting for liquidity risk in stress testing exercises. Similar 
efforts should also be done vis-à-vis non regulated entities. Liquidity risk is intrinsically 
interconnected with other risks identified during the financial turmoil, namely market risks, credit 
risks and reputation risks. Mastering these risks all together in a transparency environment is an 
important step to avoid liquidity hoarding and restore confidence. 
 
Improving central banks’ operating frameworks for providing liquidity 
 
Moral hazard considerations in the wake of a liquidity crunch are also a cause for concern for 
central banks. During the crisis, central banks have done their job by responding to an exogenous 
and general increase in the demand of central bank money and by ensuring smooth adjustment of 
liquidity conditions. However, carrying out monetary policy interventions in a disintermediated 
world raises additional issues as the bulk of liquidity needs may stem from non-banks financial 
institutions which do not have a direct access to central bank reserves, with some of them being in 
addition unregulated. As pointed out earlier, a significant source of funding lies outside the banking 
system and it is fair to say that central bank’ control over such liquidity is quite indirect and fairly 
limited.
7 As a striking point in case, the financial turmoil has evidenced that while money and credit 
aggregates, i.e. bank-mediated liquidity, have so far continued to grow at rapid pace, other elements 
of liquidity, such as outstanding asset back commercial paper have on the contrary sharply 
contracted, raising a potential policy dilemma. During the crisis, some central banks had to adapt 
their operational frameworks by expanding the maturity of their operations or widening the list of 
eligible collaterals. Further refinements may be on the agenda to design robust monetary 
frameworks. 
 
                                                      
6 In his article entitled “Liquidity risk management”, Financial Stability Review, No. 11, Banque de France, February (forthcoming), 
Goodhart (C.) uses the metaphor of a “the weary traveller who arrives at the railway station late at night, and, to his delight, sees a taxi 
there who could take him to his distant destination. He hails the taxi, but the taxi driver replies that he cannot take him, since local bylaws 
require that there must always be one taxi standing ready at the station.” 
7 See  Cournède  et al. (2008). A primer on the subprime crisis 
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Refining the assessment of risks to improve external rating 
 
Regulating rating agencies would possibly be an option. However, in the context of the 
implementation of Basel II, the rating process will inevitably play a pivotal role involving a refinement 
in the assessment of risks throughout the promotion of internal models and greater use of external 
ratings. To the extent that rating agencies are producing a public good in providing information on the 
quality of assets underlying transactions or risk exposure and constitute a key element in the 
marketability of structured products, some improvements can be considered. There are two areas, 
among others, that could deserve consideration for the future: first, greater transparency of rating 
methods and the overall role of rating agencies in the securitisation process. Second, a marked 
difference in the metric used for rating bonds and structured products, which would be a key condition 
to restore confidence in ratings. This could be done in two ways, which could also be combined: either 
by adopting another rating scale for structured products (with another symbol for example); or by 
including an additional measure in the credit rating, in particular on its volatility in times of market or 
liquidity stress. 
 
Strengthening the capital framework 
 
Finally, the recent financial turmoil has evidenced that increasing risk taking with a shrinking 
proportion of capital is not sustainable. It is even more the case in the context of fair value accounting 
where each depreciation immediately impacts on capital. Ultimately, the ability of an investor to carry 
risk is determined by her capital base. And capital should act as a buffer, i.e. it must be sufficient to 
absorb shocks. To some extent, the crisis has pointed out a profound failure on the part of leading 
banks to understand how their on and off-balance sheet exposures interact together and with their 
capital. Is it therefore desirable to ask for increased capital buffers to banks, other financial 
intermediaries and off-balance sheet structures involved in risk transfer? This could draw upon the 
experience of the hedge fund industry where some devices like lock-up periods exist and have proved 
helpful in the current turmoil to stabilize their resources. More severe capital constraints could help to 
curb excessive leverage in the financial system. However, these stricter requirements should not 
destroy all incentives to use securitisation. Higher capital buffers should be conceived not so much to 
absorb all potential risks (they would never be sufficient for that), but to act as a disincentive to excess 
risk taking. A possible solution could be to use the flexibility within Basel II framework, in particular 
including its Pillar 2, to ensure that capital buffers are adequately forward-looking. 